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1. INTRODUCTION
Fishery policies that ensure sustainable exploitation of marine benthic resources 
contribute to food security, protect them and preserve the social and economic status 
of dependant communities (Bene, 2003; World Bank, 2006). In Chile, due to the social 
and economic importance of artisanal benthic shellfisheries, there has been a strong 
political desire to achieve sustainable exploitation in these fisheries (Castilla and Defeo, 
2001). This was reflected in the 1991 Chilean Fishery and Aquaculture Law (FAL; 
D.S: 430) that regulated access to benthic and pelagic coastal resources by the artisanal 
fisher sub-sector. The FAL defined this sub-sector and incorporated new regulations 
that affect their user rights through three management steps: (a) Exclusive fishery 
access rights within a zone that extends to 5 nautical miles from the shoreline along 
around 2 500 km of coast (18º 36’ S, 70º 30’ W to 41º 27’S, 74º 10’ W) are assigned 
to artisanal fishers; (b) artisanal fishers are restricted to working (diving, finfishery) 
within the coastal region adjacent to their area of residence (regionalization); and (c), 
the allocation of exclusive harvesting rights for benthic resources to legally registered 
artisanal small-scale fishing associations, under what was defined as Management 
and Exploitation Areas for Benthic Resources (MEABRs) that was perhaps the most 
innovative management instrument of the law (Castilla, 1994, 1996; Castilla et al., 
1998; Gelcich, 2005a). Through this policy, the Undersecretary of Fisheries allocates 
territorial user rights for fisheries (TURFS) to artisanal registered associations (Castilla 
and Defeo, 2001; Defeo and Castilla, 2005; Gelcich, Edwards-Jones and Kaiser, 2005a). 
This includes the right to exclude non-members of fisher associations from exploiting 
the seabed area of MEABRs. 
The rationale behind TURFS is based on a common property approach which 
proposes that property rights will create institutional arrangements among fishers, 
who will then manage, collectively harvest and sustain the resources (Ostrom, 1990; 
Ostrom and Schlager, 1996). In addition, MEABRs should contribute to more effective 
enforcement of regulations by increasing the likelihood of compliance (Jentoft, McKay 
and Wilson, 1998; Castilla, 2007; Gelcich, Edwards-Jones and Kaiser, 2007). The 
MEABR model, which effectively takes the form of co-management, was derived from 
field experiments conducted mainly at the Estación Costera de Investigaciones Marinas, 
Las Cruces, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (Castilla and Fernández, 1998). 
In fact, the first MEABR was established experimentally in 1989 (Caleta Quintay, 
central Chile), before the law was introduced (Castilla, 1994). MEABRs regulated 
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by the law began to be decreed in 1997. According to the National Fisheries Service 
(SERNAPESCA, 2005) there are currently 547 decreed MEABRs in Chile, with a total 
seabed area of 102 338 hectares. 
In this chapter we highlight the importance of the gastropod Concholepas 
concholepas (loco), the cornerstone species that drove legislation on MEABRs as well 
as the role of this policy to achieve wider fishery objectives and generate incentives and 
conditions for self-governance. 
2.  ARTISANAL BENTHIC FISHERIES IN CHILE
The definition of artisanal and small-scale fisheries versus mid-scale and large-scale or 
industrial fisheries varies enormously and is country dependent (Castilla and Defeo, 
2001; Berkes et al., 2001). The 1991 Chilean FAL defined two main fishery sub-sectors: 
“Artisanal” and “Industrial”. An artisanal fishery is defined as a fishery extractive activity 
carried out by fisherfolk that personally direct and who normally work in coastal areas. 
For this purpose, and interpreting the law, “coastal” means the oceanic realm within 
the first 5 miles from the littoral line. To be considered an artisanal fisher one must be 
registered as such with the National Fisheries Service and fishing vessels must not exceed 
18 m in length and a maximum of 50 gross register tons. Four categories of artisanal 
vessel/boats are defined in the Law: (a) Artisanal open boat: with or without outboard 
engine (most of the artisanal benthic small-scale fishery activities and artisanal small-scale 
pelagic fin-fish fishery belong to this category), (b) Small-vessel (lancha artesanal): fully 
covered with inboard engine and maximum 12 m in length, (c) Medium-vessel: fully 
covered, inboard engine and between 12 to 15 m in length, (most of the sword-fishery 
fleet in Chile belongs to this category) and (d), Large-vessel: fully decked, inboard engine 
and maximum 18 m in length (most of artisanal small-pelagic fishery fleets belongs to this 
category) and maximum 50 gross register tons (FAL, 1991; World Bank, 2006).
To obtain an artisanal fisher licence it is required to be registered in the Registro 
Nacional de Pescadores Artesanales de Chile; fishers are also registered for the target 
species they fish. Fishermen do not have to pay a fee to register to harvest the particular 
resources they wish to fish. Once a resource reaches the category of “fully-exploitation” 
within a region, no further registration for that specific species is accepted. In regard 
to MEABRs, artisanal fishers do not pay any form of fee, but they do have to pay a 
yearly fee per hectare once the MEABR has been in operation for 4 years (now about 
US$ 6 per hectare).
According to SERNAPESCA (2005) there are a total of 54 751 registered artisanal 
fishers, which depend on different resources and livelihood strategies. Artisanal fishers 
include: (a) Armador Artesanal (boat owners), (b) Shellfisher, (c) Algae Extractor and 
(d), Artisanal Fisher as such (definitions are given in the Law). The categories are non-
exclusive and therefore can be used simultaneously. There are 6 920 algae gatherers, 
13 199 shellfishers (including divers) and 39 995 fishers (mainly finfishers) in Chile. 
Currently, indigenous (first nation) groups along the Chilean coast must also subscribe 
to one of these categories to be permitted to extract marine resources
Artisanal fishers in Chile, irrespective of livelihood strategy or vessel type, are 
organized around areas of coastal land which are officially designated as ‘coves’ (caleta 
in Spanish). These are strips of land above the high tide mark that are granted as a 
concession by the state and provide rights to users, such as the right to have access to 
the sea, the right to land a boat, the right to land catch and to erect certain buildings 
(Gelcich et al., 2005a). According to SERNAPESCA (2007) there are a total of 453 
permanent artisanal caletas along the Chilean coast.
A subset of artisanal fishers in Chile is composed of artisanal benthic small-scale 
fishers (Castilla and Defeo, 2001), these extract most species of benthic shellfishes 
(over 60 species of invertebrates, including crustaceans, molluscs, sea-urchins and 
tunicates are harvested) through: (a) manual collection during low tides (Castilla, 
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Campo and Bustamante, in press), (b) skin diving and (c), semi-autonomous or air 
compressor (“hooka”) diving gears (Bustamante and Castilla, 1987). Hooka gear 
fishers’ activities usually involve an artisanal open-boat (5–9 m long), outboard motor 
(10–45 hp), air compressor and a crew of 3–4 (boatman, assistant and one or two 
divers). Diving trips are normally during the day, usually less than 15 miles from the 
base port and diving in no deeper than 25 m (Castilla and Defeo, 2001). In Chile, the 
most economically important benthic artisanal resources are the muricid snail loco 
(Concholepas concholepas; Photo 1), the red sea urchin erizo (Loxechinus albus) and 
lapas or key-hole limpets (several species of genus Fissurella) (SERNAPESCA, 2005; 
Moreno et al., 2006).
3. REGULATORY HISTORY OF THE LOCO FISHERY: A DRIVER FOR MEABR 
POLICY 
The loco fishery is considered as the main catalysis for the inclusion of MEABRs 
within the FAL (Castilla, 1996; Gelcich, Edwards-Jones and Kaiser, 2005a; Castilla, 
Gelcich and Defeo, 2007). The loco fishery showed three fishery phases prior to the 
implementation of the 1991 FAL. The first (1960–1974) was characterized by landings 
of around 3 000–6 000 tonnes, used mainly for domestic consumption. These landings 
probably represented a sustainable harvest level for loco (Figure 1). Chile then adopted 
a neo-liberal policy framework. This, together with the implementation of an aggressive 
exchange rate policy and open markets in 1974–75, substantially improved fishing 
export earnings, and produced the necessary incentives for Chile to become the region’s 
leading fish and shellfish exporter (Thorpe, Ibarra and Reid, 1999). Demand from Asian 
markets was constantly increasing and local credit programs created by the government 
provided favourable investment opportunities for new boats, diving gear and processing 
plants, thereby stimulating even further product demand (Schurman, 1996). At that 
time, as most loco fisheries in Chile operated under an open access policy, artisanal 
fishers, although based at specific artisanal 
caletas, used to migrate along the country. 
Thousands of divers moved around Chile, 
mainly to the southern regions, sparking 
fights between locals and outsiders in what 
was named at the time the “loco war” or “loco 
fever” (Meltzoff, Stotz and Lichtensztajn, 
2002; Reyes, 1988). Between 1976 and 1981 
loco landings abruptly increased reaching a 
peak of 24 800 tonnes in 1980. According 
to a Fisheries Department official, the open-
access state of benthic resource fishing in 
Chile and the newly opened export markets 
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Photo 1
Landings of a collective harvest of loco 
(Concholepas concholepas) from the 
MeaBr at caleta el quisco in 2001 
Figure 1
Evolution of total landings (MT) of loco including  
conch (shaded dots) and price (US$/MT) of loco  
without conch (open dots)
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were enough to lead to a “tragedy of the 
commons” situation (see Castilla, 1994; 
Gelcich et al., 2005b). The loco fishery was 
closed between 1989 and 1992 (Figure 1). 
Since 1992 the loco fishery has been 
regulated by the FAL and since the year 2000 
loco can be extracted exclusively from inside 
allocated MEABRs. When harvested from 
MEABRs, the total allowable catch (TAC) 
of loco has previously been evaluated by 
biological consultants (final approval is made 
by the Under-Secretary of Fisheries) and the 
objective is that the fisheries are biologically 
sustainable. This represented a strong move 
toward rationalizing the fishery for loco and 
other benthic resources. Between 1993 and 
2005 the annual extraction of loco fluctuated 
between 2 500–5 000 tonnes a year (weight 
values include conch). Landings were similar 
to those experienced during 1957–1974, which 
can be considered as a sustainable fishery 
period (Castilla et al., 2007). Nevertheless, 
during the post MEABR-policy period (1997–
2006) the market export value of a loco has 
ranged between US$ 15 000–25 000 a tonne 
(without conch) with an almost doubling 
of loco price during the open access period. 
These prices were in general lower during 2003–2006 as more fishery associations obtained 
TACs for loco. This suggests that in the past 10–11 years under the FAL management 
guidelines, the supply and demand market dynamics had conditions that could increase 
sustainability of loco fisheries operating in Chile. Importantly, biological data support 
the fact that MEABRs have been successful in maintaining target species. Castilla et al. 
(1998) showed that the number of loco was significantly higher in a MEABR (El Quisco) 
compared to nearby open-access areas. Mean sizes of individuals and catch per unit 
effort values were also significantly higher (for other shellfish resources see Castilla and 
Fernández, 1998). In addition Manríquez and Castilla (2001) have shown the importance 
that MEABRs and No-Take areas have as spawning grounds for the loco.
Since 2000 loco landings have risen considerably from around 1 000 tonnes to 
around 5 000 tonnes. Initially, during 2001–2002, Regions V and VI in central Chile 
contributed most loco landings. Currently, most landings come from Region X in 
southern Chile (Figure 2). These landings have been increasing since 2002 and have 
already reached more than 2 000 tonnes/yr (Figure 2). This has generated fear in caletas 
of central and northern Chile that prices will drop drastically. 
4.  MEABRS POLICY BEYOND THE LOCO: MULTIPLE SPECIES AND SELF-
GOVERNANCE 
The loco has formed the main fishery that has motivated the MEABR policy; in fact 
85 percent of the operating MEABRs have loco as a one of the principal species to 
be managed (Castilla, Gelcich and Defeo, 2007). However, the implementation of 
MEABRs has gone beyond an exclusive focus on the sustainable harvest of loco. In 
this section we examine MEABR policy in terms of the number of different benthic 
species included in management plans and the implications of MEABR policy over 
fishers’ self-governance.
Figure 2
Loco landings in tonnes (locos with shell)  
exclusively from MEABRs in Chile across  
different regions (2001–2005)
0 400 800 1200 1600 2000
IX
XII
III
I
II
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
X
XI
N
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 
Loco landing MEABRs (MT)
Management of the loco as a driver for self-governance of small-scale benthic fisheries in Chile 445
The MEABR experience 
Since the implementation of the first official MEABR in 1997, policy uptake has 
constantly increased throughout all regions of Chile. Of a total of 547 MEABRs 
(May 2005), 301 have fully-approved benthic resource management plans and are in 
full operation. The remaining 246 are not allowed to operate until they have their 
plans approved. The total area of sea floor comprising MEABRs is approximately 
102 338 ha. Species that are included in MEABR management plans vary between fisher 
associations, however loco, key hole limpets and sea urchins are the most important, 
representing around 85, 70 and 30 percent of MEABR management plans respectively 
(Castilla, Gelcich and Defeo, 2007). Currently there are around fifty species included 
in MEABR management plans in Chile; these include algae, bivalves, echinoderms, 
gastropods, tunicates, cephalopods and crustaceans (Table 1). 
Loco has been the most important species to be harvested from MEABRs, 
accounting for around 30-60 percent of landings; however, algal species (mainly 
Gracilaria) have also played an important role (Figure 3). It is important to note that 
variability observed in landings of the beach clam macha (Mesodesma donacinum), 
and scallops (Argopecten purpuratus) from MEABRs may have been due to the highly 
variable nature of the stocks that appear to be affected by El Niño events (Stotz and 
González, 1997; Wolff and Mendo, 2000). Therefore, in making MEABRs that focus on 
table 1
Benthic species included in MEABR management plans along the Chilean coast
ALGAE
luga negra (Sarcothalia crispata)
luga roja (Gigartina skottsbergii)
Picuyo (odontocymbiola magallanica)
huiro palo (Lessonia trabeculata)
huiro negro (Lessonia nigrescens)
huiro flotador (Macrocystis integrifolia)
Chasca (Gelidium sp)
luga (Mazzaella laminarioides)
Cochayuyo (Durvillaea antartica)
Chicorea de mar (chondracanthus chamissoi)
Pelillo (Gracialaria chilensis)
BIVALVES
Macha (Mesodesma donacium)
ostion del norte (argopecten purpuratus)
Chorito (Mytilus chilensis)
Cholga (aulacomya ater)
Culengue (Gari solida)
almeja (Protothaca thaca)
Choro zapato (choromytilus chorus)
almeja (Venus antiqua)
Disco (Semele solida)
Navajuela (tagelus dombeii)
taca (Mulinia sp)
taquilla (Mulinia edulis)
ostion del Sur (chlamys vitrea)
EQUINODERMS
erizo (Loxechinus albus)
GASTROPODS
loco (concholepas concholepas)
lapa rosada (Fissurella cumingi)
lapa negra (Fissurella latimarginata)
lapa bonete (Fissurella costata)
lapa picta (Fissurella picta)
lapa reina (Fissurella maxima)
lapa (Fissurella sp)
lapa (Fissurella nigra)
lapa (Fissurella pulchra)
lapa (Fissurella bridgessi)
locate (thais  chocolata)
Caracol (argobuccinum sp)
Caracol palo palo (argobuccinun argus)
Caracol trophon (thophon sp)
Caracol rubio (Xanthochorus cassidiformis)
Chocha (calyptrea trochyformis)
CEPHALOPODS
Pulpo (octupus mimus)
Pulpo (enteroctopus megalocyathus)
CRUSTACEANS
Jaiba peluda (cancer setosus)
Jaiba mora (Homalaspis plana)
Jaiba reina (cancer coronatus)
Picoroco (austromegabalanus psittacus)
TUNICATES
Piure (Pyura chilensis)
Source: SerNaPeSCa (2007).
Case studies on fisheries self-governance446
these species, there can be shifts from great 
successes to failures (González et al., 2006). 
Other gastropods (mainly Thais chocolata) 
have begun to be harvested during the last 
3 years accounting for around 5 percent of 
total MEABR landings.
It is important to highlight that 100 percent 
of loco landings in Chile come from MEABRs. 
However, in the past five years only around 5 
percent of key-hole limpet landings are from 
these areas. Sea urchin landings from MEABRs 
represent around 1 percent of national open 
access landings. Therefore, although key-hole 
limpets and sea urchins are present in MEABR 
management plans, their harvest from the 
MEABRs is secondary. 
Self-governance and MEABRs
From 1997 to the present, Chilean small-
scale fisher associations have gradually 
been adapting to their new lifestyles as 
non-migrating businessmen and as part of 
co-management regimes. In general, fisher 
associations have been able to follow policy requirements identifying areas of sea 
floor over which they wish to make a claim and pay for baseline studies from which 
resource TACs and management plans are established. Fishers are following MEABR 
regulations to the extent that they are beginning to pay an annual fee to government for 
the right to maintain the management area. This fee is fixed per hectare of seabed and 
as such is not related to catch or revenue; it is paid after the fourth harvest.
Fisher associations pay external consultants to undertake yearly follow up 
assessments of stock in the management area as required by the Law. Effectively, 
fishers’ have taken control of their harvesting decisions regarding: (a) The amount of 
TAC to be gathered and the timing of this harvest, within the officially designated 
harvest season and approved TAC, (b) the price fishers will accept for their resources, 
(c) the number of buyers to whom fishers sell and (d), how income is distributed 
within the associated members (Gelcich, Edwards-Jones and Kaiser, 2007). Fishers 
have responded to the challenge of these new harvesting decisions that involve dealing 
with new responsibilities associated with management and commercialisation (Gelcich, 
Edwards-Jones and Kaiser, 2007). Fisher association leaders have also started to view 
the MEABRs as more than a marine tenure. Now they see them as a way towards 
organization that would facilitate fisheries and non-fisheries related business activities 
such as tourism and seafood restaurants. An important driving force for this was the 
fact that MEABR resource TACs are given to the association and not individually. This 
promotes the right incentives for cooperation instead of confrontation between fishers 
(Castilla, Gelcich and Defeo, 2007).
Fishers have attached important non-economic values to the existence and ownership 
of MEABRs, such as pride and accountability. As part of MEABR consolidation, 
innovative strategies that account for fishers’ entrepreneurship include attempts to 
sell management area resources collectively between associations, for instance in the 
form of cooperatives, such as PACIFICOOP in central Chile or TERPESCAR in 
Carelmapu, Southern Chile. PACIFICOOP is a selling cooperative formed by 15 
fishing associations of central Chile. They are trying to find new markets for benthic 
resources and are currently seeking a way to export live loco to Asian markets. This 
Figure 3
Landings from MEABRs for years 2001–2005 in Chile
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will add value to the low prices that have been paid for their resources during the last 
three years (Castilla, Gelcich and Defeo, 2007). TERPESCAR is a private company 
formed by fishers from five fishing associations and represents around 700 artisanal 
fishers. This association has managed to administer the landing ports thus acquiring 
new responsibilities and incomes. In the year 2004 they sold 1 197 227 loco worth 
around $US2 000 000. They have also managed to contract the services of a general 
manager for the company and an accountant (World Bank, 2006). These initiatives, 
although so far unique in the country, show how the MEABR policy has opened new 
ways for fishers’ long-term engagement as resource stewards and how it has encouraged 
self-empowerment and self-governance to solve fishery problems. 
5.  FISHERS CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH MEABRS
The problems associated with ‘open-access’ and the traditional ‘command and control’ 
approach to fisheries, led the search for MEABRs as a management alternative under 
which the responsibility for benthic resource sustainability is shared by those who 
have an interest in the fishery’s success (government and fishers). The Chilean fisheries 
department has addressed the issues of government legislation to support legal rights 
as recommended by much of the co-management and common-property research 
literature (Ostrom, 1990; Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997). However, fisher associations 
have had to implement the MEABRs at local scales and have faced different problems. 
Small-scale artisanal fishers are not homogenous and do not share a common 
understanding of the problems that confront them (for studies on fishers perceptions 
of MEABRs see Gelcich et al. 2005a,b, Gelcich et al., 2006; Castilla et al., 2007; Gelcich 
et al., in revision; World Bank, 2006).
Studies that have looked into the functioning and fishers perceptions regarding 
MEABR agree that it is essential to address enforcement problems in order for 
MEABRs to develop into successful enterprises and not just another of many 
development narratives. Granting user rights is not enough and a strong policy to stop 
encroachment is needed. In fact, within a questionnaire study published by the World 
Bank (2006), when small-scale artisanal fishers (N= 143) were asked about their main 
problem with MEABRs, 65 percent mentioned encroaching (theft) from other fishers. 
This study also highlighted that MEABRs have provided basic elements to increase 
collective action and generate new business and collaboration ideas. Further, Gelcich et 
al. (2005a,b) provide evidence that the speed of MEABR uptake has had an important 
effect over the abundance of “open-access” diving grounds, which are becoming 
increasingly scarce. This has important livelihood consequences for artisanal fishers. 
Table 2 presents factors that artisanal fishers identified as those important to address as 
well as the solutions they propose. 
table 2
Problems with MEABR policy identified by artisanal fishers and their suggested solutions
Factor to be addressed Fishers’ solution
enforcement - More support from the national fisheries service to oversee execution of Meabrs
- Stronger sanctions for fishers caught steeling from Meabrs
- Financial support to look after areas
increase Meabr 
productivity
- include more species in Meabr plans
- experiment with feeding locos in ponds (e.g., grow-out/ranching in situ)
- rescue locos from sand embankments
- experiment with re-populating sea urchins and other species
- adopt a multi-species/ecosystem approach
- Feeding loco in mesh bags
- rescuing juvenile loco from harvested shells
Source: World bank (2006), gelcich unpublished data.
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6.  DISCUSSION
Over the past several decades, scholars have argued over governance strategies for 
management for commons and common-pool resources (CPRs). In fact, the theory 
of the commons has undergone major transformations, moving from the “tragedy of 
the commons” model, to dealing with small-scale, community-based systems as ways 
of promoting self-organization and self-governance (Ostrom, 1990; Berkes, 2006). 
Within the fisheries sector, the use of rights based management strategies to re-establish 
sustainability in open-access fisheries is becoming increasingly popular. The experience 
with TURFS in Chile, which was implemented as a way to avoid the collapse of the 
loco fishery, has been successful in terms of managing some benthic artisanal fisheries 
in a sustainable way and generating basic incentives for fishers’ empowerment. 
However, if the policy is going to succeed in the future, scientists and practitioners 
must respond to important challenges. Most published studies on the human 
dimensions of MEABRs stress the need for fishers to have more liberty managing 
MEABRs as a way to adapt these to local realities and create incentives for developing 
institutions of self-governance (Castilla and Defeo, 2001; Meltzoff et al., 2002; Castilla 
et al., 2007; Gelcich et al., 2005a,b, 2006, 2007; World Bank, 2006), i.e. to shift from the 
current co-management approach used in Chile (= collaborative co-management; Sen 
and Nielsen, 1996) towards an adaptive co-management approach. Folke et al. (2002), 
defined adaptive co-management as “the process by which institutional arrangements 
and ecological knowledge are revised in a dynamic, ongoing process of learning by 
doing”. 
Adaptive co-management combines the ‘dynamic learning’ characteristic of adaptive 
management (Holling, 2001) with the ‘linkage’ characteristic of cooperative management 
(Jentoft, 2000), and collaborative management (Olsson, Folke and Berkes, 2004). The 
adaptive co-management approach treats policies as hypotheses and management as 
experiments from which managers can learn (Gunderson, 2000). Most importantly, 
adaptive co-management theory implies that management practices should be adjusted 
by the monitoring of feedback signals of social-ecological change (Berkes, Colding 
and Folke, 2003). This shift towards adaptive co-management would imply the need 
for participatory research. Small-scale coastal artisanal fisheries with well-demarcated 
fishing grounds provide ideal situations for experimental management research 
(Castilla, 2000; Johannes, 2002; World Bank, 2006). In addition, if MEABRs are going 
to successfully adapt, managers should encourage local communities (associations) to 
experiment and continuously adapt to changes (social or ecological). These are factors 
we feel are an essential part of the so-called Ecosystem-Based Management Approach 
(FAO, 2003; Arkema, Abramson and Dewsbury, 2006; Christie et al., 2007). 
At present the MEABR policy has left few legal alternatives for community 
experiments and subsequent governance adaptations. This is unfortunate as participatory 
research in support of adaptive management is becoming almost commonplace in many 
developing countries (Edwards-Jones, 2001) under the premise that the participation 
of resource users and other stakeholders is important not only in the management of 
resources, but also in research orientated toward the generation of information and 
innovations that shape how resources are understood and exploited (Johnson et al., 
2004). In addition it forms a basic building block for self-governance of MEABR 
resources.
Coastal management beyond MEABRs
A new self-governance policy in Chile that attempts to grant user rights to first nation 
coastal communities is currently being discussed in the Chilean senate. This initiative 
originated in a bottom-up manner from first nation Lafquenche and Huiche cultures 
and has the support of the Undersecretary of Planning and the Undersecretary of 
Fisheries. Use-rights will be granted depending on the importance of specific coastal 
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areas for cultural manifestations (defined as “customary use” in the policy) and on 
the way the community attempts to manage the area. Cultural manifestations include 
fishery, religious, recreational and medicinal uses. Adolfo Millabur, a mayor of an 
important council in Chile and part of a Lafquenche community, highlights that the 
policy “is very important in order to legitimize coastal first nations communities rights 
to govern coastal areas”. It is important to highlight that in theory the policy will grant 
autonomy to the first nation community to govern defined coastal areas. This includes 
autonomy for management and conflict resolution. In this way this policy will have 
the potential to generate the first self-governed coastal management practices in Chile 
(Ecoceanos, 2005).   
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